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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-QUESTION OF FACT FOR JURY-BASIS FOR
CONCLUSION OF JuRY-Appeal from verdict of jury and judgment for de-
fendant below for damages for injury to wife of appellant, appellant, and
car of appellant. Accident occurred on a paved street, widely used for
travel, on a dark, misty night, at a time when street was slippery. Appel-
lee's truck was parked near the curb, without lights. Appellant dimmed
his lights for an approaching car and left them dimmed after he passed it,
some fifty feet from appellee's truck. Appellant's car struck appellee's
truck and was thrown eighty feet down the road on its side, and was prac-
tically demolished. Held: There was a basis for conclusion of jury of con-
tributory negligence on part of appellant. McKee v. Suez, Appellate Court
of Indiana, September 12, 1929, 167 N. E. 720.
The only question presented by assigned error of overruling of appel-
lant's motion for new trial was whether there was a basis for conclusion of
jury that appellant was guilty of contributory negligence.
Where contributory negligence is the proximate cause of the injury,
plaintiff's remedy is barred. Kingan & Co. v. Cleason, 101 N. E. 1027;
Nave v. Flack, 26 Ind. 443; Hathaway v. Toledo, Wabash and Western Rd.,
46 Ind. 25. The essential elements necessary to make available the defense
of contributory negligence are: (1) want of ordinary care by plaintiff and
(2) a causal relation between that want of care and the injury. Salem-
Bedford Stone Co. -. O'Brien, 12 Ind. App. 217. What is or is not ordi-
nary care depends on the circumstances. Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Schmidt,
71 N. E. 663. Ordinary care should be that degree of care and foresight
which a reasonable and prudent man would or ought to use under the cir-
cumstances. (For an extreme case as respects contributory negligence, see
Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bennet, 35 N. E. 1033, where a pedestrian
undertaking to cross a track running on a city street, when he sees a train
approaching at 930 feet, was held to be negligent.) The converse in facts
of the principal case is presented in Collins v. McMullins, 225 Ill. 430, where
plaintiff left car parked without lights and defendant drove into it at night.
It was there held that plaintiff could not recover, due to his contributory
negligence in leaving car parked without lights. The result in both cases
is the same, that where both are negligent and negligence of both is proxi-
mate cause of the injury, neither can recover for his injuries.
In the principal case there was a basis for the jury's conclusion of con-
tributory negligence on the part of appellant. Such force, as was neces-
sary to throw appellant's car eighty feet and wreck it so completely, could
result only from excessive speed. Under existing circumstances, high speed
and running with lights dimmed when it was not necessary, does not show
exercise of ordinary care, and has a causal relation to injuries com-
plained of. H. N. F.
INSURANCE-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE--CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY-PROXI-
MATE CAUS--Plaintiff sued on a policy of accident insurance for the death
of her husband. The policy covered death resulting "directly and inde-
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pendently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through ex-
ternal, violent, and accidental means." Plaintiff recovered below and de-
fendant now claims the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, in
that it was not shown that death was effected directly and independently
of all other causes. Decedent left his work, feeling ill, and started home
in his car. A witness testified that he heard a crash and found decedent
in his car, bent over the steering wheel, the car having run into a tree with
great force. The coroner said that death was due directly to shock, with
certain diseases as contributing factors, but that death would probably
have occurred by the shock alone. The jury found that the accident was
the only efficient and active cause of death. HELD: judgment affirmed,
The jury was given proper instructions and there was evidence to support
the verdict. Kokomo Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Wolford, Appel-
late Court of Indiana, July 6, 1929; 167 N. E. 156.
There was evidence to support the verdict, and although there was evi-
dence to the contrary, in such case an appellate court can look only to the
evidence to sustain the verdict; and if, on all the evidence, reasonable men
might draw different inferences therefrom, one supporting the verdict and
the other impeaching it, the court must make the inference supporting the
verdict. Board of Commissioners of Parke County v. Sappenfield, 10 Ind.
App. 609; Bischof v. Mickels, 147 Ind. 115.
The causes of death referred to in the insurance policy were proximate
and direct causes and not remote causes. Continental Insurance Co. v.
Lloyd, 73 N. E. 824; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Fitzgerald, 75 N. E. 262;
Robinson v. National Life and Accident Insurance Co., 76 Ind. App. 161.
The instruction asked for by defendant that "if insured suffered from
diseases and his death resulted from shock caused by external, violent and
accidental means jointly and in connection with such diseases, and if in-
sured's bodily infirmities were aggravated by the accident and his infirmi-
ties contributed to his death, there could be no recovery," was properly
denied. Continental Insurance Co. v. Lloyd, supra; Central Life Insurance
Co. v. Fitzgerald, supra; Robinson v. National Life and Accident Insur-
ance Co., supra.
If the accident set in motion a force that progressed upon existing con-
ditions, in natural and usual sequence, to effect the fatal result, the acci-
dent can be found to he the proximate cause of death. Continental Insur-
ance Co. v. Lloyd, supra.
In direct accord with this case, it has been held that where the policy
provided the same as in this case, and insured fell and broke his leg and
seven weeks later contracted pneumonia and died, that the disease was the
natural sequence of insured's weakened condition resulting from the fall,
and that the fall was therefore the proximate cause of death. Robinson V.
National Life & Accident Insurance Co., supra.
The case is undoubtedly sound. R. C. H.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EVIDENCE--CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DELEGA-
TION OF PowEs-Under the city manager law, Acts 1921, p. 594, c. 218,
No. 3, the city clerk was required to determine within five days after its
filing whether a petition, asking that the question of adoption of city man-
ager government be submitted to the electorate of a city, was signed by at
